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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
DOCKET #34516
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,

vs.
KELLY A. DUNAGAN,

Garry W. Jones, Jones, Brower & Callery, P.O. Box 854, Lewiston, ID 83501,
Paul T. Clark, Clark and Feeney, P.O. Drawer 285, Lewiston, ID 83501
TRANSCRIPT OF APPEAL
Appealed from District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in
and for the County o f Clearwater
Honorable John R. Stegner, District Judge Presiding
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PAUL THOMAS CLARK
Idaho State Bar No. 1329
CLARK and FEEMY
The Train Station, Suite 201
13th and Main Streets
P. 0. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-95 16
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

1

CHRIS M. DUNAGAN

)

Plaintiff,

Case No.

)

1
VS.

)

KELLY A. DIJNAGAN,

1
1

COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE

)

Defendant.

**********

Plaintiff alleges:

Plaintiff is now and for more than six weeks last past has been an actual bonafide resident of the
State of Idaho.

,-

11.
The parties hereto were married at South Lakea Tahoe, Nevada, on May 29, 1999, and ever since
said date have been and now are husband and wife.
111.
No children have been born as the issue of this marriage
COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE -1LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND FEENEY

LEWISTON. IDAHO 8 3 5 6

000

v.
The defendant owns several items of separate property all which should be confirmed unto him.

VI.

1

During the marriage the parties have acquired various items of community property and have
incurred community debts.

8

VII.

9

During the marriage of the parties conflicts in views, likes and dislikes, personalities and dispositions

10

have arisen which are so deep as to be irreconcilable and irremediable and render it impossible for the parties

11
to continue together as husband and wife, which conflicts will be set fonh on order of the Court, or upon

12
hearing of the matter.

13
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WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays as follows:
1.

That a decree of this Court be entered dissolving the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore

existing between the plaintiff and the defendant, and granting to the plaintiff an absolute divorce from the
defendant;
2.

By said decree the Court confirm unto the plaintiff his separate property;

3.

By said decree the Court confirm unto the defendant his separate property;

4.

That by said decree the Court make an equitable division of the community property of the

parties and provide for the payment of the community debts; and
5.

For all other just relief.
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CLARK:and FEFNEY

STATEOFmMO
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County of Nez Perce

)

)se.

CBlW M.DIJNAOAN, king fmt duly sworn on onth, deposes and says:
That he i s the Plaintiffwmtl in the foregoingComplaint; that heha red thcfc*e.&oinginscmmwr

know$theconmn hereof and tho facts sratedrberein uretrueto the best ofherknowledge, information md
belief.

M.I
S m S m E D AND

to bfore

this

~ A U
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Notary Public in and for the State ofIdaho
Residing atMy Commission expires:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D I S T R I C Ib ".' C I I " ~
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
.
, :j7

CHRIS M. DUNAGAN
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 05-00324

)
)
)

MUTUAL TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
Re: property and debt

1

VS.

KELLY A. DUNAGAN,

_....... EEP!!T

av-A

)
)
)

Defendant.
The parties having entered into a Stipulation for Temporary Restraining Order Re: Property and
Debt,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDEWD, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the parties
shall be restrained and enjoined during the pendency of this action or until further order of this court
from damaging, selling, mortgaging, encumbering, secreting, removing, hiding, transferring or other
wise concealing any of the assets and/or money of the parties and from incurring any debt, other than

14

1

I

for ordinary and normal living expenses.

cvd

DATED this ___ day of August, 2005.
J ~ G E

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

i3

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the a d a y of August, 2005,I caused to be served a true and correct copy
of tbe foregoing document by the method indicated be!ow, and addressed to thr. following:
Mr. Ganry W. Jones
Jones, Brower & Callery
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Paul Thomas Clark
Clark and Feeney
PO Box 285
1229 Main Street, Ste 201
Lewiston, ID 83501
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Ove~nightMail
Telecopy
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Oveinight Mail
Telecopy
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DlSTRlC
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
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CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,
Plaintiff,
VS

.

KELLY A. DUNAGAN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

1

Cyi .-5
e.

. .,,;. ....., :;; . , . .:
i

"

ORDER SETTING TRIAL

)
)

)

Trial in the Magistrate Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Clearwater, at Orofino, Idaho, on January 27. 2006
beginning at the hour of 9:00 a.m.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:
A Settlement Conference will be held on January 18. 2006
beginning at the hour of. 3:30 p.m.
2.

Discovery should be initiated so that all responses are due no later
than 15 days prior to trial.

3.

Pursuant to ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16(h), parties are
to file with the Court and serve upon all opposing counsel, or upon
parties not represented by counsel, 30 days prior to trial, a list of all
exhibits to be offered at trial and a list of names and addresses of
all witnesses which such party may call to testify at trial.

4.

1 ! . J ,-;
..

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled matter is set for Court

1.

!I,

&V~VOS-~~&

CASE NO. CV2005-324
.2.,

,

!.>\

Each party hereto file with the Court exhibits to be used as
evidence during the trial one week prior to the trial date. Plaintiffs

exhibits shall be entitled "Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1," etc., and
defendant's exhibits shall be entitled "Defendant's Exhibit A," etc.
Said exhibits shall be accompanied by a statement that counsel
has produced for examination by the other party all exhibits to be
introduced for examination by the other party all exhibits to be
introduced into evidence, and a list of such exhibits shall be
attached containing a brief description thereof. Each party should
prepare sufficient copies of documentary evidence to provide
copies for opposing party to the Court in addition to the original. No
exhibits will be permitted at trial other than those described and
listed and filed pursuant to this order except when offered for
impeachment purposed or when permitted by the Court in the
interest of justice.

5.

Each party file a statement by January 18, 2006 containing:
a. A statement that all answers or supplemental answers to
interrogatories or admissions reflect all facts known to date.
b. A concise statement of issues of law remaining for trial.
c. A concise statement describing the issues of fact remaining for
trial.
d. A list of all community personal property and the values at which
said party would offer to sell or buy each item.
e. A proposal for division of community property and debts.

f. A list briefly describing all exhibits proposed or offered by any
party, which can be admitted into evidence without objection
and those exhibits to which only an objection as to relevance or
materiality will be raised.
g. A statement or listing of any evidentiary questions anticipated at
the time of the trial.
h. Authorities and briefs in support of the party's position on any
evidentiary questions or issues of the law.

Randall W. Robinson - Magistrate
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

d%l
5

I hereby certify that on this
day of October, 2005 true copies of the
foregoing Order Setting Trial and Discovery was mailed:
Garry W. Jones
Jones, Brower & Callery
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ldaho 83501
Paul Thomas Clark
Clark and Feeney
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, ldaho 83501
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN

Garry W. Jones
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 1254

ZOO5 DEC I 4 P 3: 14
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BY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICJAL. DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
CI-ZRIS M. DUNAGAN,
Plaintiff,
VS.

KELLY A. DUNAGAN,
Defendant.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

CASE NO. CV 05 - 00324

ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE

)

Upon stipulation of plaintiff and defendant in Clearwater County case numbers CV 2005
-

00324 and CV 2005 - 0033 1, it is hereby ordered that said cases be consolidated for hearing,

with the complaint filed by KELLY A. DUNAGAN under Case No. CV 2005 - 00331 being treated
in all respects as if it were an Answer & Counterclaim in Case No. CV 2005 - 00324, with said
KELLY A. DUNAGAN being known in all future actions as the defendant and counter-plaintiff.

ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
IT IS IGREBY CERTIFY that the undersigned is the (Deputy) Clerk of the above entitled
Court; that on the

day of December, 2005, the undersigned enclosed a certified copy of the

Order to Consolidate, to which this Certificate is attached, issued by the above entitled court in the
above entitled action, in an envelope addressed to:
GARRY W. JONES
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
P. 0. BOX 854
LEWISTON, ID 83501

PALJL TI-IOMAS CLARK
CLARK & FEENEY
P. 0 . BOX 285
LEWISTON, ID 83501

which are the present and last known addresses reported to the undersigned by Gary W. Jones;
placed the necessary postage thereon, and deposited the same in the iJnited States Post Office.
nii'
DATED this&.
daypf December, 2005.
',

ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE

i;03\!4 Ci{;:i$ ;iliiSEK
CLERK-DISTRICT COURT
CLEAR\'IAT;IER COUETY
Ofi~Flii,2,IDAHO
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWA
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,

::!\SE !.lG

)
) Case No. CV 05-00324

1

Plaintiff,

-b A

b~d532q/
PDEPui

BY

vs.

)
) ORDER Re: Motion to Compel aud ORDER
) VACATING TRIAL

KELLY A. DUNAGAN,

1

Defendant/Counter-plaintiff.

s: 2

)
)
)
)

The above-captioned matter having come on regularly and duly for hearing before the undersigned
Judge of the above-entitled Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Continue Trial and Motion to Compel; the
Plaintiff, Chris Dunagan, having appeared by and through his attorney of record Paul Thomas Clark; the
Defendant, Kelly Dunagan, having appeared by and through her attorney of record Gany Jones; and the

I
I
I

I

Court being fully advised,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant
Kelly Dunagan shall provide full and complete answers to Plaintiffs Interrogatory Nos 2 and 3 and provide
a depreciation schedule in response to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents. Said discovery shall
be provided to Plaintiffs attorney on or before January 18,2006.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the trial presently scheduled for January 27,2006, is VACATED
and reset for Court trial to commence on TUESDAY, MARCH 21,2006, at 9:00 a.m.

/.

DATED This

1

ay o

HONORABLE RANDALL ROBMSON

ORDER -I
ww

OFFICES O F

Q08QO

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501

I
I
I
I
I

I hereby certify on the " 411
day of January, 2006, a hue CODY
..
of the foregoing instrument
was:
Mailed
____ Faxed
- Hand delivered
- Overnight mail to:

5

7

8
g
10

Mr. Gany W. Jones
Jones, Brower & Callery
P.O. Box854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Paul Thomas Clark
Clark and Feeney
PO Box 285
1229 Main Street, Ste 201
Lewiston, ID 83501
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CLARK AND FEENEY
IEWISTON. IDAHO 83501
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECONDXUDICIAL DISTRI

4

STATE OF IDAI-IO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

5

CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,

6
Plaintiff,

7
KELLY A. DUNAGAN,

9

Case No. CV 05-0324

)
)
)
)

v.

8

1

ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL

1

)
)

Defendant.

10

1
)

11

Plaintiffs Motion to Compel having come on regularly and duly for hearing before the undersigned

12

/I

13
14

15

/I

l
1il
/

Judge of the above-entitled Court; plaintiff having appeared by and through his attorney of record, Paul
Thomas Clark, defendant having appeared by and through her attorney of record, Garry Jones, the Court
having heard arguments of counsel and being fully advised;
NOW, TI-IEREFORE, ITIS HEREBY ORDERED, that the defendant is ordered to prepare and serve

16-

l7

18
19

Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs Second Set of Lnterrogatories and Request for Production of Documents
and Request for Admissions to Plaintiff by March 14,2006

-

DATED t h i s l g d a y of March, 2006

ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL - 1 ;.

LAW OFFICES O F

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. :OAHO 8350:

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

,&p

day of March, 2006, I caused to be served a true and correct copy
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
of the foregoing document by the method lndlcated below, and addressed to the following:
/

Mr. Garry W. Jones
Jones, Brower & Callery
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Paul Thomas Clark
Clark and Feeney
PO Box 285
1229 Maln Street, Ste 201
Lew~ston,ID 83501

Cd
0
D
D

d
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)
U.S Ma11
Hand Dehvered
Ovemlght Mall
Telecopy (FAX)

OF THE COURT

ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL - 2
LAW 0 F F G . S

YFo0 8 0 0

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501

PAUL THOMAS CLARK
Idaho State Bar No. 1329
CLARK and FEENEY
The Train Station, Suite 201
13th and Main Streets
P. 0. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-95 16
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
CIfRIS M. DUNAGAN

1
)

Plaintiff,
vs .
KELLY A. DUNAGAN,
Defendant

l4
l5

16
17

l8

1I

?)
)
)

1
)
1

Case No. CV 05-00324

AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION
DUCES TECUM -Kelly Dunagan
. . . .
~gga;:~,
2806, at :9,:00.a.*.j

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the unders~gnedattorney for Plamt~ffw ~ l take
l
testimony on oral

I1

examinabon of KELLY A. DUNAGAN, before Linda Carlton, Certified Court Reporter, Court Reporter

1I1

at which place you are invited to appear and take part in the examination as you may deem advisable and

State of Idaho, on April 7,2006, at 9:00 a.m. ofthat date and thereafter from day to day as the taklng
11 offorthethedeposison
may be adjourned at the office of Paul T o m s Clark, 1229 Mam Smet, Lewxton, Idaho,

i

proper.
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTLFIED that this deposition is being taken duces tecum pursuant to Rule
34, and the deponent is required to produce the following documents:
I.

All writings and instruments of whatsoever nature showing all receipts and also all
expenditures of any sums of money by you for the last three (3) years, including, but not
limited to, checkregisters, checkstubs, canceled checks, bank statements, receipts, billings,
whether paid or unpaid, ledger or account books, bank passbooks for savings or other
accounts, and every other written instrument or thing of whatsoever nature whether
hereinabove specif~callymentioned, in any way relating to any sums of money received or
expended by you for the preceding three (3) years.

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM -1uw

OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501

Copies of all deeds, mortgages, closing statements and all other documents dealing with the
purchase or sale of any real property by you during the last ten years.
Bank statements, ledgers or account books, bank passbooks for any savings accounts and
checking accounts held in your name for the last three (3) years.
Stock certificates, bonds and evidences of title to any and all property now in your name or
the name of nominees for your account.
Loan agreements, notes, repayment schedules and all other documents dealing with loans
secured in your name, on which you are presently indebted.
All financial statements including balance sheets and profit and loss statements for each of
the last five years, together with any copies of financial statement provided to any lending
institutions or financial institution for the purpose of securing credit or any other purpose
during said five year period.
All bank statements, ledgers or account books, bank passbooks for any savings accounts and
checking accounts held in your name only for the last three (3) years.

.\I1 I Y ~ I 5tnlcments,
I~
ledgers or account books. ba~ikpassbook.;tbi any snvln&:sct<coilntsand
chccklng accounts held !n both thc l!la~ntit'iand Dct'c11dant's name\ for thc last three (3)
years.
Documentation on payment made on the debt of the Krystal Cafi from January 1, 1999 to
the present, including but not limited to the source of the funds used to pay the debt.
Example, the Defendant made, among others, a $20,000 lump sum payment in 2005. The
source of and documentation of the funds used to make that payment is requested
Copies of all bank statements, ledgers or accounthooks, bank passbooks for any savings and
checking accounts for the Krystal Cafk from January 1, 1999 to the present.
Copies of ail investment statements including DRA's, CDs or investments of any kind made
by you from January, 1999 to the present.
12.

Copies of your daily account booWaccounting journal for the Krystal Cafe from January,
1999 to the present.

DATED This

2day of March, 2006.
CLARK AND FEENEY

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM -2-

LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

&

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of March, 2006, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Mr. Gany W. Jones
Jones, Brower & Callery
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

I&
O

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM -3LAW OFFECES O F

DOOQo

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DlST
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARW
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CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,
plaintiff,

KELLY A. DUNAGAN,
Defendant.
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CASE NO. ~~2005-00'00324
,
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,
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ORDER SETTING TRIAL

)
)
)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled matter is set for court trial in the
Magistrate Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County
of Clearwater, at Orofino, Idaho, on APRIL 26 and 28,2006 beginning at the hour of 9:00

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:
1.

A Status Conference will be held on April 19, 2006 beginning at the hour of
8:30 a.m., to be conducted by telephone.

Plaintiffs counsel shall

initiate the conference call.

2.

Discovery should be initiated so that all responses are due no later than 15
days prior to trial.

3.

Pursuant to ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16(h), parties are to file
with the Court and serve upon all opposing counsel, or upon parties not
represented by counsel, 30 days prior to trial, a list of all exhibits to be
offered at trial and a list of names and addresses of all witnesses which such
party may call to testify at trial

-

ORDER SETTING TRIAL 1

/
.

4.

Each party hereto file with the Court exhibits to be used as evidence during
the trial one week prior to the trial date. Plaintiff's exhibits shall be entitled
"Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1," etc., and defendant's exhibits shall be entitled
"Defendant's Exhibit A," etc.

Said exhibits shall be accompanied by a

statement that counsel has produced for examination by the other party all
exhibits to be introduced for examination by the other party all exhibits to be
introduced into evidence, and a list of such exhibits shall be attached
containing a brief description thereof. Each party should prepare sufficient
copies of documentary evidence to provide copies for opposing party to the
Court in addition to the original. No exhibits will be permitted at trial other
than those described and listed and filed pursuant to this order except when
offered for impeachment purposed or when permitted by the Court in the
interest of justice.

5.

Each party shall file a statement by April 19.2006 containing:
a. A statement that all answers or supplemental answers to interrogatories
or admissions reflect all facts known to date.
b. A concise statement of issues of law remaining for trial.
c. A concise statement describing the issues of fact remaining for trial.
d. A list of all community personal property and the values at which said
party would offer to sell or buy each item.
e. A proposal for division of community property and debts.

ORDER SETTING TRIAL - 2

f. A list briefly describing all exhibits proposed or offered by any party,
which can be admitted into evidence without objection and those exhibits
to which only an objection as to relevance or materiality will be raised.
g. A statement or listing of any evidentiary questions anticipated at the time
of the trial.
h. Authorities and briefs in support of the party's position on any evidentiary
questions or issues of the law.
Dated this %day

of March, 2006.

&A%&

I-/

-

V

Randall W. Robinson -Magistrate Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
day of March, 2006 true copies of the foregoing
I hereby certify that on this
Order Setting Trial and Discovery was hand delivered or mailed, postage pre-paid, to:
Paul Thomas Clark
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston. ID 83501
Garry W. Jones
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN
Clerk of the District Court
B~:'

ORDER SETTING TRIAL - 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF I%E
STATE OF LDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATEK

1

CHRIS M. DUNAGAN

)

1

Plaintiff,

:!';b ),::.!;
,.,"
.,., ,.-..

73

,

?:
.. I,!.'#

Case No. CV 05-00324

1

j

vs.

)
)

KELLY A. DUNAGAN,

INTERLOCUTORY DE~&E-OF.
DIVORCE
:

"

.. -. . - -

'The parries having appeared before the undersigned judge of the above-entitled Court; plaintiff

9

I/

having appeared in person and by and through his attomey of record, Paul Thomas Clark; Defendant having
appeared in person and by and through her attomey ofrecord, Gassy W Jones; the parties having entered into
cestain stipulations; and the Court having considered the stipulations of the parties and good cause appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, based thereon, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

I.
The bonds of matrimony now and heretofore existing between plaintiff and defendant he and the
same are hereby dissolved and the parties are hereby granted an absolute divorce from the other on the
grounds of irreconciIable differences.

IS.
Defendant's name is hereby changed to Icelly A. Kircher.

111.
If Defendant continues to reside in the family home and/or continues to occupy the commercial
property where her business (Crystal Caf6) is located, Defendant shall make the payments on said properties
and shall receive credit for any principal 1-eduction on the indebtedness thereon from March 21, 2006,
forward.
n/.

The trial on the remaining issues regarding property and debt will be held on Wednesday, April 26,

2006, at 9:00 a.m. and continuing on Friday, April 28, 2006, at 9:00 a.m. at the Clearwater County
Courthouse in Orofino. Idaho.
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DATED this

2,

day of

CERTIFICATE O F SERVICE
,2006, I caused to be served a true and
day of /
I HEREBY CERTIFY
that on the
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Mr. Gany W. Jones
Jones, Brower & Callery
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

d

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Paul Thomas Clark
Clark and Feeney
PO Box 285
1229 Main Street. Ste 201

@

IJS Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
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CLERK OF THE COURT
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W THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

1

CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No. CV 2005-324
MEMORANDUM OF
AUTHORITIES

KELLY A. DUNAGAN,

i

Defendant.

I/
16
l5

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Chris M. Dunagan, by and through Paul Thomas Clark, Clark
and Feeney, his attorney of record, and submits, pursuant to this Court's request, the following

17
Memorandum of Authorities.

18

l9
20

21

1

ABPLICABL,E LAW

1I/

22

The par01 evidence rule provides that when a contract has been reduced to a writing that
the parties intend to be a final statement of their agreement, evidence of any prior or
contemporaneous agreements or understandings which relate to the same subject matter is not

23

admissible to vary, contradict, or enlarge the terms of the written contract. Simons v. Simons,134
24

25
26

/

Idaho 824,828, 11 P3d 20,24 (2000) (citations omitted). Par01 evidence may be considered to
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES

1
LAW OFFICES O F

LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501

aid the trial court in determining the intent of the drafter of a document if an ambiguity exists. Id.
at 828, 11 P.3d at 24 (citation omitted). If the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous
1

1I

the intention of the parties must be ascertained from the deed, m d parol evidence, that is,
documentary, oral or real evidence extrinsic to the deed itself, is not admissible to ascertain
intent. Id. at 828, 11 P.3d at 24 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also Hall v. Hall, I16
Idaho 483,486, 777 P.2d 255,258 (1989) (Where the deed names both spouses, as husband and
wife, the same parol evidence showing a separate interest necessarily varies the deed and is barred
by the parol evidence rnie.j
It is well established that when community funds are used to enhance the value of one

lo
l1

1/I

12

spouse's separate property, such enhancement is community property for which the community
is entitled to reimbursement, nnless such funds used for enhancement are intended as a gift.
Hoskinson, 139 Idaho at 460, 80 P.3d at 1061 (citations omitted). Community funds spent to

13

14
l5
l6
17

reduce the principal of a mortgaged indebtedness on one spouse's separate property retain their

I

1I

character as community property and can be reimbursed. Id. at 460, 80 P.3d at 1061 (citation
omitted). In situations where a spouse's equity in property has been increased through the
application of community funds to the payment of debt on the property, the measure of
reimbursement to the community should be the amount by which such equity is enhanced. Id. at

l9
20

1

460, 80 P3d at 1061 (citation omitted).
The measure ofthe reimbursement for community expenditures on separateproperty is the

21

increase in value of the property attributable thereto, not the amount or value of the community

22

contribution. Id. at 460, 80 P.3d at 1061 (citations omitted). The party seeking such

23
I

24

reimbursement to the community canies the burden of demonstrating that the community

25
26
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expenditures have enhanced the value of the separate property, and the amount of the
enhancement. Id. at 460, 80 P.3d at 1061 (citation omitted).

ARGUMENT

A.

THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE BARS THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY PAROL
EVIDENCE REGARDING ANY INTENT TO TRANSFER INTEREST IN THE
SUBJECTPROPERTY BECAUSE THE QUITCLAIM DEED'S LANGUAGE IS PLALN
AND UNAMBIGUOUS.

In this case, the Defendant is attempting to introduce evidence that contradicts the plain
and unambiguous language of the quitclaim deed to establish that she did not intend to transmute
her separate property interest in the house into communityproperty when she executed said deed.
As set forth above, such evidence is barred by the parol evidence rule
The Defendant transmuted any separate property interest she had in the home to a

l2

l3
14
l5

li

1/

1

16

community interest when she signed and executed the quitclaim deed. Said quitclaim deed
satisfies the statutory requirements regarding conveyances ofreal property (See I.C. 5 55-601) and
satisfies the statutory requirements of1.C. 3 32-917. Furthermore said deed is unambiguous. All
of the statutory formalities are met and the deed clearly states that the interest in the subject
property is being transferred to the Plaintiff and Defendant, as husband and wife. As such, the

17
applicable law requires that the intent must be ascertained from the deed itself and any parol

18

20
21

1I
11

22

!I

l9

1I

evidence is not admissible to ascertain intent. Because transinutation of the subject property iias
been established by the Plaintiff with clear and convincing evidence, though the plain and
unambiguous language of the quitclaim deed, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court
hold that when the Defendant executed said deed, any separate property interest was transmuted

MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES
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00

The Defendant has cited in support of her position Hoskinson, supra. However an

I

1

examination of that case shows it offers no support for the Defendant's position. In that case there
were two quitclaim deeds, regarding the plaintiffs separate property house, signed and notarized
on the same day. 139 Idaho at 459,80 P.3d at 1060. One deed conveyed the defendant's interest

/
1

4

6

to the plaintiff and the other deed conveyed the plaintiffs interest to the plaintiff and defendant
as husband and wife. id. at 459, 80 P.3d at 1060. The defendant claimed that the deed to

I
I

I

I
I

"husband and wife" transmuted the plaintiffs property from separate to communily property. Id.

7

at 459,80 P.3d at 1060. The Court held that the defendant failed to prove a trmsmi~taticnby clear

8

9

l1

l2
13

1I
/

1)

and convincing evidence. Id. at 459,80 P.3d at 1060. The Court noted that the evidence did not
establish that the plaintiff intended to make a gift to the community and the Court also noted that
the evidence did not establish whether the deed to the plaintiff and the defendant was signed

I

I
I

1

before or afier the deed to the plaintiff i d at 459-60,80 P.3d at 1060-61.

In our case there is only one deed, not two conflicting deed's signed and executed on the

14

l5

I7

l8
l9
20

I1
1

1

1

23
24

prohibits introduction of parol evidence in ow case. See Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 175,898
P.2d 1081, 1086 (1995) (Plaintiff should not be allowed, by extrinsic evidence, to contradict the
plain language of the deed and claim he never really intended to convey the land). Said deed is
clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant intended to transmute the property interest into

I

I

I
(

I

that of the community.

21

22

same day, and that deed's language is plain and unambiguous thus the parol evidence rule

1

B.

1I

THE COMMUNITY IS NOT ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT.
The community is barred from reimbursement for community funds spent on the plaintiffs

separate property debt if the defendant failed to show that the community expenditures have

25
26
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enhanced the value of the separate property and the amount of the enhancement.
DATED thi&

Aday of June, 2006.
CLARK and FEENEY

Attorney6 for Plaintiff

-23

I hereby certify on t h e 2
day of June, 2006, a trne copy
of the foregoing instrument
was: -Mailed
-Faxed
A Hand delivered

Mr. Gany W. Jones
Jones, Brower & Callery
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
13
CLARK and FEENEY
14
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D I & ~ STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLWRWATER
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KELLY A. DUNAGAN,
Defendant.

)

-

-

-

CASE NO. CV 2005-00324

1
)
)
)

DECREE OF DIVORCE

)
)
)
)

This matter came before the court on June 20, 2006. A trial was conducted with
the parties present and Paul Thomas Clark representing the Plaintiff and Garry Jones
representing the Defendant. Based upon the Memorandum Opinion and Decision
entered in this case, Judgment is entered as follows:
The Plaintiff is and was a bona fide resident of the State of Idaho and has been a
resident for more than six (6) weeks preceding the filing of his complaint.
This Court has jurisdiction to determine the divorce and the property and debt
distribution.
An interlocutory divorce was entered between the parties on March 25,2006 with
property and debt issues resewed for the trial that took place on June 20, 2006.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED:
1. The bonds of matrimony between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were
dissolved on the grounds of irreconcilable differences , and the Defendant awarded an
absolute decree of divorce from the Plaintiff on June 20, 2006.
2. The property and debts of the parties shall be divided as set forth in Exhibit A,
annexed hereto, with the addition that the Plaintiff shall receive a copier from the
Page 1 - DECREE OF DIVORCE
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Defendant. The parties will sign all necessary papers effectuating the transfer of their
interest in the property that is assigned to the other party except for the Crystal Cafe
property, as discussed below.
3. The Defendant shall have sixty (60) days to make an equalization payment to

the Plaintiff of $108,500. Upon payment in full of the equalization payment $108,500
within said sixty (60) days, the Plaintiff will sign over and release to The Defendant ail
interest in the Crystal Cafe. If The Defendant does not make the equalization payment
within the prescribed time, the Crystal Cafe will be put up for sale in a commercially
reasonable manner. The Plaintiff and The Defendant will list the Crystal property with
an agreed upon realtor. If the parties cannot agree, upon filing of a Motion, this Court
will select a realtor. The Defendant may continue to use the property until sold for her
business. The Defendant shall keep the business in presentable condition in order to
ensure its value for purposes of selling. The Defendant is responsible for paying
expenses associated with the property such as water, sewer, garbage, power, and loan
payments. Furthermore, the Defendant is to cooperate with the real estate personnel in
all aspects in the sale of the property. Neither party will withhold consent to any
reasonable offer.
-T'

DATED this

/% b a y of

Id

,2006

k-

/

Magistrate Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

'' 4
.9

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage
prepaid, on the &day

of

2.006, to the following:

Paul Thomas Clark
Clark and Feeney
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Garry W. Jones
Jones, Brower & Callery
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN, Clerk
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description
1) Krystal Cafe bldg
2) Krystal Cafe bus.
3) Krystal Cafe bank acct
4) Grand Ave house
5) wife's retirement acct
6) husb. retirement acct
7) w. smathers loan
8) 2005 tax ret.-wife
9) Zion's bank acct
10) Orofino C.U. acct
11) Lewis-Clark C.U. acct
12) Am-West Kelly/Sherrill
13) Bank of Latah -wife
14) Steve Lyman prints
15) B of A bank acct-husb.
16) 2005 GMC Denali
17) oak bedroom set
18) couch
19) N & stand
20) fridge
21) Kelly's diamonds
22) bedding-before marriage
23) utensils-before marriage
24) oak table &chairs
25) comforters
26) computers
27) her office desk
28) recliner
29) freezer
30) stove-wife's before mart.
31) washldry-wife's before
32) stereo-wife's before
33) outdoor furnlBBQ-wifes
34) coffeelend tables
35) microwave
36) 2003 Bayliner boat
37) DVDlsurround sound
38) lawn mower
39) camcorder
40) 2005 Dodge P.U.
41) flatbed trailer
42) guns
43) bucket truck
44) gun safe
45) recliner
46) telecomm. equip
47) tools
48) fishinglcamping gear
49) drift boat-husb. before
50) lawn mower/weedeater
51) 32' travel trailer

value
236.500

debt
39594.64

equity
196,905.36

to wife
196,905.36

to husband

52) lamp
53) husband's VISA
54j taxes dispute
totals

-4500
536,573

Equalization Payment

708,500

151334.33

208,087.03

295,713.92

-4500
78480.23
108,500
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF C L Z R R W F R
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,

)

Plaintiff,
VS

KELLY A. DUNAGAN,
Defendant.

!

CASE NO. CV2005-00324

j
)

.

q',g

,&--QE43Cy',
.

1

1
1

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND DECISION

)
)

1

This case involves the distribution of debt and property between the
parties incident to divorce. An interlocutory divorce was granted on March 23,
2006. A trial was conducted on June 20, 2006 regarding the distribution of
property and debt. Paul Thomas Clark represented the Plaintiff, Chris M.
Dunagan ("Dunagan"), and Garry W. Jones represented the Defendant, Kelly A.
Dunagan (Kircher) ("Kircher"). Dunagan, Kircher, Terry Rudd, Jeff Roberts, and
Carmen Coty testified at the trial. Exhibits were admitted into the record and
considered. Also considered was a Memorandum submitted by Dunagan a week
after the trial on the parole evidence rule and the parties' Pretrial Statements.
This Court has jurisdiction as both parties have resided in Idaho at least
six weeks prior to the filing of their actions.
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties married on May 27,2000. They separated in 2005. An
interlocutory divorce was entered on March 23, 2006.
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Prior to marriage, Kircher operated the Crystal Cafe. On July 24,2000,
the parties acquired the present site of the Crystal Cafe. $80,000 of the $90.000
purchase price was financed through the Bank of Latah. Both Kircher and
Dunagan were placed upon the title to the Crystal Cafe. Shortly after purchase,
part of the land adjoining the Crystal Cafe was sold.
The Crystal Cafe was gutted out. Massive repairs were performed.
Dunagan alleged putting in 2000 hours of work. Kircher testified she put roughly
2000 hours into the renovation of the site and credibly asserted that Dunagan
could not have put in that much time. The Crystal Cafe did not open at the new
site until October I,2001.
On November 24,2003, the residential property owned by Kircher was
refinanced through Zions Bank. As a condition of the refinancing, Kircher
quitclaimed her interest in her home to "Kelly Dunagan and Chris Dunagan, wife
and husband." The quitclaim is a form document with the name of Zions Bank on
the lower right hand corner. The quitclaim signed by Kircher was filed by Zions
Bank with the Clearwater County Recorder. Over Dunagan's objection based on
the parole evidence rule, Kircher testified that she signed lots of papers at the
closing and did not know that she was giving up any interest in her home to
Dunagan. Kircher also testified that she would not have signed the form had she
understood she was giving an interest in her property to Dunagan. $20,000 from
the proceeds from the loan was used to pay off a secured loan on an RV,
separate property owned by Dunagan. Proceeds were also used to pay an
unsecured debt owed by Kircher to her prior spouse.

Page 2 - MEMORANDUM OPINION AND DECISION

At the time Dunagan and Kircher entered into marriage, they orally agreed
that they would keep their finances separate. During their marriage, Dunagan
and Kircher kept their finances separate. Kircher paid all the insurance and
payments on the house and her business. Dunagan gave Kircher $500 on two
occasions.
DISCUSSION

A. Uneven Distribution.
Kircher argues that an uneven distribution of property and debt should be
issued in her favor. Kircher alleges the existence of an oral agreement between
her and Dunagan that the parties would keep their property separate and that
their actions corresponded to that agreement. Kircher paid all the taxes,
insurance and house payments on the real properties during the marriage. The
time of cohabitation during the marriage of Kircher and Dunagan was not very
long, approximately five years. Kircher requests an uneven distribution of the
property based upon this oral agreement and that the home and her business,
the Crystal Cafe be awarded to her.
ldaho Code 3 32-917 requires that "all contracts for marriage settlements
must be in writing, and executed and acknowledged or proved in like manner as
conveyances of land are required to be executed and acknowledged or proved."
The ldaho Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of full compliance
with ldaho Code § 32-917before an agreement is recognized:
One of the major purposes for requiring life-changing documents to
be written and executed is to impress upon the parties the
importance of the legal consequences of the document. For
example, prenuptial agreements and wills must be written, signed,
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executed, and acknowledged. See I.C. § 32- 922; I.C. 5 15-2-502.
Dividing the property of a community that may have lasted for
decades has consequences at least as important as distributing the
assets of the deceased. Indeed, the process of drafting an
agreement often shows the parties that they omitted major issues
or made hasty assumptions while negotiating. In addition, the
requirement of writing and execution substantiates that the parties
actually did come to a meeting of the minds in a vitally important
area.
Stevens v. Stevens, 135 ldaho 224, 229, 16 P.3d 900, 905 (2000).
Kircher recognizes the unenforceability of an oral agreement under ldaho
Code § 32-917, but argues that the circumstances surrounding the oral
agreement and the parties' adherence to the agreement constitute compelling
circumstances, permitting an uneven distribution of property and debt.
"Generally, community property will be divided in a substantially equal manner
unless there are compelling reasons which justify otherwise. I.C. § 32-712(1);

Rice v. Rice, 103 ldaho 85, 645 P.2d 319 (1982)." Maslen v. Maslen, 121 ldaho
85, 88, 822 P.2d 982, 985 (199q). Kircher's argument must be rejected.
First, to recognize an oral agreement as a compelling circumstance does
violence to the legislative scheme. The parties had ample opportunity to comply
with the statute and sign a proper prenuptial or postnuptial agreement if that was
their intention. The failure to do so does not provide a compelling reason to
ignore the statute requiring a written agreement.
ldaho Code 3 32-912 sets forth a list of non-inclusive factors that can be
considered in determining whether a division shall be equal. Besides the oral
agreement, the only factor argued was the duration of the marriage. However,
this factor alone does not constitute a compelling reason to set aside the
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substantially equal division of assets. In Maslen v. Maslen, 121 ldaho 85, 87,
822 P.2d 982, 984 (1991), the ldaho Supreme Court upheld the magistrate's
finding that a short troubled marriage in which a regular living pattern was never
established did not provide a compelling circumstance for an uneven distribution.
Generally, to show compelling need, hardship is the most important factor.
Thus, an unequal division was upheld on the basis that "Bill, as a profoundly
disabled person, probably unemployable and saddled with ongoing expenses
related to his condition, required a greater share of the community property to
support himself." Hentges v. Hentges, 115 ldaho 192,195,765 P.2d 1094,
1097 (Ct.App. 1988). See also Brazier v. Brazier, IIIldaho 692,697,726 P.2d
1143, 1148 n. 2 (Ct.App. 1986) ("(T)he court may deviate from equality in order

to alleviate hardship."). Kircher has failed to show the type of hardship
contemplated by the statute to constitute compelling circumstances and thereby
justify deviating from the normal rule of a substantially equal division of property
and debt.
B.

Division of the Property and Debt.

The parties' property and debt is divided in accordance with the spread sheet
annexed hereto as Exhibit A. An explanation of the rationale for the division is
provided as follows.
1. Item 1: Krystal Cafe
The parties agree the Krystal Caf6 building is owned by both parties and
that the building and debt should be assigned to Kirchner. The parties differ on
the value of the building.
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Dunagan relies upon an appraisal performed at his request by Terry Rudd,
an appraiser for over forty years. Mr. Rudd's report submitted a restricted use
report which cannot be used as the basis for a loan. Mr. Rudd testified that he

would have performed additional research if intended for use to determine loan
eligibility. He estimated that the additional research could increase or decrease
the appraised value by five to ten percent.
Mr. Rudd used two methods to calculate the fair market value of the
building. He did not use the income approach because he did not have access
to the earnings of the Cafe. Mr. Rudd used the market and cost method. Mr.
Rudd conceded each approach has its problems.
The market approach relies upon reviewing comparable sales. The seven
sales used by Mr. Rudd included four sales from 2003. Two sales were from
Orofino including a lawyer's office, and three sales were of restaurants in
Lewiston. Mr. Rudd came up with a square footage price and multiplied it by the
size of the premises.
The cost approach takes into account the original price and cost of
repairs. The cost approach is normally greater than the market approach. This
is especially so in this case as both the original cost and the cost of the repairs
are inflated. While Mr. Rudd used the original cost of the sale, he was not aware
that a part of the original parcel had been sold off.
Secondly, Dunagan exaggerated the number of hours put into the project,
just as he exaggerated the value of the items he seeks to assign to Kircher.
Dunagan testified that he put 2000 hours into rebuilding the Cafe. Mr. Rudd
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assigned $25.00 an hour to his efforts. Kircher credibly testified without rebuttal
that Dunagan had spent long periods of time away at his work and that he never
performed work when she was not there. Under the most liberal interpretations
of Kircher's testimony, she put in 2000 hours of effort. Therefore, Dunagan could
not have put in that number of hours that he attributed to his efforts. Mr. Rudd
testified that even adjusting for these two factors, his estimate would not be
affected by much. As a contractor, Mr. Rudd thought $176,500 represented a
fair value for the repairs which he assigned under the cost method.
Using the cost method, the value of the Crystal Cafe came to $256,500.
The market value came to $236,500. Mr. Rudd gave the market value twice the
value of the cost method in arriving at his final appraised value of $241,500. Had
the income method been used, Mr. Rudd would have given three times the value
to the market value, two times to the income value and one value for the cost
method.
Kircher estimated a value of $150,000, but gave no facts to back up her
estimate other than relying upon the value of the place when purchased and the
slow state of the market. Kircher testified that she was aware of two commercial
places that had been up for sale for quite some time. Despite the length of sale,
Kircher testified that the price for one of the places, the bowling alley, had even
recently increased.
Mr. Rudd conceded that it would take time to sell the Crystal Cafe. Mr.
Rudd opined it could take six months to two years to sell the caf6; with an
auction, the property could be sold after four months of preparation.
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An appraisal is not an exact science. However, Mr. Rudd has been in the
appraisal business, as noted, for more than 40 years. He has sold homes. He
has constructed homes and other buildings as a contractor. He was secure
enough in his estimate to say that he would pay the price that he came up with.
Based upon Mr. Rudd's expertise, his opinion must be given great weight.

Mr.

Rudd's methodology is far more reliable in establishing the fair market value of
the Cafe than Kircher's guesswork.
The market value of $236,500 will be used as the fair market value. Given
the small market in Orofino, exact comparable sales are not going to occur. Mr.
Rudd credibly testified that the sample businesses he used gave a fair
approximation of the fair market value.
The market approach is adopted as a better measure of the fair market
value rather than using Mr. Rudd's hybrid method in which the cost method is
utilized to arrive at the final fair market value. The cost method, while usually
high, came in even higher than to be expected given its failure to take into
account the sale of part of the property and its reliance on the amount of work
Dunagan allegedly put into the building. In addition, another appraiser, Carmen
Coty, testified that she does not use the cost analysis when the sale has taken
place more than five years prior. In this case, the sale took place more than five
years ago. As Mr. Rudd made clear, the practice of combining the values of the
market approach and the cost method is not required by his profession. The
impact of using solely the market approach will have little impact and be well
within the range of 5 to 10% deviation to the fair market figure that could occur
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with additional information. Given the circumstances, the cost method is better
applied as a guidepost and not an appropriate measure of the fair market value.
2. Item 2: Caf6 Equipment
With respect to the restaurant equipment, Dunagan argues all the items
listed on Plaintiffs Exhibit 16 which are purchased after the date of marriage
should be valued at their tax cost. There are several problems with Dunagan's
argument.
First, Dunagan commits the same error in appraising the value of the
equipment as he does in valuing many of the disputed items he assigns to
Kircher. The tax cost Dunagan urges as the value of the items represents the
purchase price. Kircher credibly testified that kitchen equipment dramatically
reduces in value. Kircher sold a dishwasher she never used for $1000 that she
purchased for $5800. Kircher's accountant, Jeff Roberts, testified the tax cost
does not necessarily have anything to do with the fair market value. For
example, she bought entire, used kitchen equipment from a restaurant for
approximately $6000 in 2000. She now assigns half the value to the equipment
more than five years after purchase. The value after tax depreciation is
approximately one-quarter of the value of the equipment.
Second, Dunagan ignores not only that items such as the dishwasher no
longer exist, but also seeks to double count items by counting them both in the
personal property calculations and also the restaurant business. As explained by
Kircher, she incorrectly listed some personal items as assets of the cafb for tax
purposes. Thus, one of the propane stoves listed at item 43 on Plaintiffs Exhibit
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16 is personally used and considered in valuing the home. A computer, listed on
Defendant's Exhibit A as item 26, also appears as item 47 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 16.
Kircher has purchased $34,210.08 of items for the restaurant during the
marriage to Dunagan excluding the dishwasher. Deducting the propane stove
and the computer yields $31,329.83 of purchases.
There are several values given to the purchase of the restaurant
equipment, none of which is entirely satisfactory. As discussed, Dunagan's value
using the purchase cost is decidedly too high. Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 represents to
the Clearwater County Assessor that the value of the entire personal property at
the restaurant as $6109. The inventory does not appear to include all the items
owned by Kircher.
The tax depreciation value assigned to the items purchased after marriage
is $4966.03. Plaintiffs Exhibit 16. On the one hand, this figure seems too small
as it only assigns $1559.83 to the equipment purchased in 2001 that Kircher
assigns as having the value of roughly $3100. On the other hand, it is difficult to
project a value as much as $7333.20 to the carpeting. Thus, the depreciated
value is appropriate to use as the value for the older equipment, but not the
newer purchases since 2002 which have no tax net book value.
The best measure for the value of the items may well be the sale of the
dishwasher which sold for less than one-fifth its value, even though not used and
not retained as long as most items on the list. Taking into account the sale of the
dishwasher, the depreciated value appears to be the closest to the market value,
Conceding that the depreciation schedule may seek to represent a faster
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acceleration in the value than what the market would normally bear, the
depreciated value in this case comes closer to the true value than cost when
purchased.
The depreciated value will only be used for the equipment purchased
during 2001. For more recent items, Kircher has assigned a value of $500 to
item 55 and $200 to item 52 which amount to roughly one-half the original cost.
These values will be accepted given Kircher's expertise in purchasing and
valuing restaurant equipment and one-half the cost will be assigned as fair
market value to the remaining items purchased since 2002. The total amount of
the equipment purchased during the marriage excluding the computer, one of the
propane stoves, the dishwasher and the copier is $9649.99.
As a non-essential item to the business, Dunagan will be awarded the
copier. Dunagan sets the value of the copier as $1475.08 and so this value will
be adopted. Deducting for the value of the copier, Kircher's equipment will be
valued at $8174.91. This value comports with the value of the restaurant
equipment attributed to Kircher just prior to her marriage to Dunagan. Prior to
her marriage to Dunagan, Kircher estimated her purchases of restaurant
equipment between 1994 and 2000 to be worth $9840. Plaintiffs Exhibit 36. It
can be expected that the initial purchases would consist of essential items that
would retain their value more than later purchases.
3. Item 3: Krystal Cafe Savings Account

With respect to item 3, Kircher argues that she should be credited with a
separate property interest of $10,232, the amount of money she alleges in the
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account at the time of marriage. Dunagan concedes that tracing is proper.
However, Dunagan argues that Kircher has failed to meet her burden in proving
the separate character of the property because of months in which no bank
records were introduced to show the amount of' money in the account. Dunagan
also argues that the account dropped below the amount at the time of marriage.
The "party asserting the separate character of property must prove the
property is separate with reasonable certainty and particularity." Weilmunsfer v.
Weilmunsfer, 124 Idaho 227, 234, 858 P.2d 766, 773 (Ct. App.1993). "However,
our Supreme Court has stated that 'a requirement of showing that community
funds were exhausted at the date of purchase of each disputed asset, imposes
too heavy a burden of record keeping on the average spouse.' Speer, 96 ldaho
at 131, 525 P.2d at 326." Id. at 238. Although not producing all the bank
records, Kircher has shown with reasonable certainty and particularity a separate
property interest in the amount of $8,062.06. $8,062.06 is the amount of the
Latah Bank account on the date of the marriage on May 27,2000. The bank
account has had greater funds than $8062.06 since then.
Dunagan argues that the fact that the accounts in June 2003 and March
2003 are missing means that Dunagan cannot show her separate property
interest sufficiently. The test is whether the separate property interest can be
identified with reasonable certainty, not absolute exactitude. Kircher need not
produce all the records. In the months before and after March 2003 and June

2003, the account never dipped below $18,534.93. Since then, the funding level
of the account has been persistently above that amount. The present value that
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both agree on of $22,368.23 is far in excess of the $8062.06. A review of the
records does not disclose any large deposits or withdrawals, but very regular
deposits and withdrawals reflecting the restaurant business. The $8062.06 is
remote, 70 months prior to the date of the interlocutory divorce. The accounts for
several years have not dipped much below $20,000. Kircher has met her burden
even though Defendant's Exhibit B does not show the amounts in the account for
the months of March 2003 and June 2003.
Kircher also did not provide bank account statements after December
2005. Again, there is no suggestion that the accounts dipped anywhere close to
$8062.06 from January 2006 through the date of the interlocutory divorce of
March 23,2006.

Kircher has met her burden in establishing with reasonableness and
particularity her separate property interest in the amount of $8062.06. Thus, the
community property interest will be assigned as $14,306.17.
4. Item 4: The Home

The parties do not dispute the appraised value of $125,000 for the home.
I find the testimony and report of the licensed appraiser, Carmen Coty, to be

persuasive and adopt $125,000 as the fair market value of the home.
The parties differ as to the amount of community interest in the home.
Kircher denies that a legal quitclaim she signed granting her and Dunagan a
community property interest in the home is effective.
Kircher testified that she was not aware that the papers Zions Bank gave
her in obtaining a loan to purchase the restaurant gave any interest in the home
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to Dunagan. She testified that she would not have signed the loan if she had
known that the loan involved giving Dunagan an interest in the home. Dunagan
objected to this testimony as in violation of the parole evidence rule.
There are three appellate cases addressing the parole evidence rule in the
context of deeds. First, in H a l v. Hall, 116 ldaho 483, 484, 777 P.2d 255,

256 (1989), the Supreme Court held that testimony from the parents was
inadmissible under the parole evidence rule that the parents intended to gift to
their son the value of the property that exceeded the agreed upon price. The
testimony contradicted the unambiguous language in the deed that the entire
value of the property was transferred to the son and his wife.
In Bliss v. Bliss, the husband claimed that he had gifted his interest in the
land to his wife solely to avoid a tax lien. The Supreme Court held that the
husband failed to overcome the presumption of separate property. The Supreme
Court rejected the use of the husband's testimony as in contradiction to the
unambiguous language in the deed and emphasized, "The policy considerations
underlying the rule in Hall and similar cases, as well as the statute of frauds, are
welt founded and enduring." The Court approvingly cited an earlier case in
noting that
(t)he statute was enacted to guard against the frailties of human
memory and the temptations to litigants and their friendty witnesses
to testify to facts and circumstances which never happened.
Experience had convinced both jurists and lawmakers that the only
safe way to preserve and pass title to reat property is by a written
conveyance subscribed by the grantor. The beneficialeffects of this
statute would be desfroyed if a grantor could come in years
afterwards and submit oral testimony to show that the conveyance
was nof infended as an absolute grant but was only infended to
creafe a trusteeship in the grantee. Dunn v. Dunn, 59 ldaho 473,
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484, 83 P.2d 471, 475-76 (1938) (emphasis added, citations
omitted). Likewise, Gordon should not be allowed, by extrinsic
evidence, to contradict the plain language of the deed and claim he
never really intended to convey the land. The magistrate correctly
ruled that evidence regarding the parties' intent and conversations
when the deed was executed was inadmissible to contradict the
deed. We find no error in the magistrate's determination that
Gordon failed to rebut the statutory presumption of separate
property.

Bliss v. Bliss, 127 ldaho 170, 175, 898 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1995).
Finally, in Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, as here, a spouse argued that "he
signed the quitclaim deed simply because the lender presented it to him during
the loan closing, that he signed it along with many other papers the lender
presented to him, and that he had no intent to transmute his property into
community property." Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 ldaho 448, 459-460, 80 P.3d
1049, 1060 - 1061 (2003). In Hoskinson, the Supreme Court held that the

spouse failed to prove a "transmutation by clear and convincing evidence. T k
evidence did not establish that Reed intended to make a gift to the community."
Id. at 460.

Hoskinson is distinguishable from this case. The court in Hoskinson was
faced with two quitclaim deeds regarding the same real property signed on the
same date and filed at different times. The wife granted her interest in the
property to her husband in one quitclaim. In the other quitclaim, the husband
deeded his interest in the real property to both the wife and himself. "The
evidence did not establish whether the deed to Reed and Elizabeth was signed
before or after the deed to Reed." Id. The identical date on the two deeds
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created the ambiguity necessary to permit testimony as to the intent of the
parties.
In this case, there is no ambiguity. The deed is unambiguous in providing
that Kircher "do hereby convey, release , remise, and forever quit claim unto
Kelly Dunagan and Chris Dunagan, wife and husband" the home at issue. In the
absence of any ambiguity or fraud, the parole evidence rule prevents testimony
that differs from the unambiguous language of the quitclaim deed. Thus,
Kircher's testimony that she did not intend to convey any interest in her home to
Dunagan is rejected under the parole evidence rule. The entire value of the
home is treated as an asset of the community. The home and debt associated
with the home will be assigned to Kircher.
5. Agreement of the Parties.
I have adopted the values and the designations as to who should receive
the property and debt as set forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit A
with the exception of the aforementioned copier. I have also adopted the values
and designations the parties stipulated to during the trial which are as follows:
ltem 8: The parties agreed at trial that the value of the income tax return of
$2309 should be awarded to Kircher.
ltem 14: The parties agreed at trial that the value of the Lyman prints
retained by each of the parties offsets each other's value.
ltem 20: The refrigerator will be assigned to Kircher at a value of $300 by
agreement of the parties.
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Item 36 The 2003 Bayliner Boat will be assigned to Kircher at a value of
$13,000 along with the debt.
7. Disputed items.

Unless otherwise stated, the values of the items Kircher assigned to the
items allocated to her have been adopted as the values. Kircher purchased the
items and so has a better idea than Dunagan as to their value. Furthermore, I do
not find Dunagan's valuations to be credible. Dunagan admitted he used the
new value or the purchase value for items 20, 21,24,25, 34, 35, 37, and 39.
Each of these items he assigns to Kircher. Items he assigns to himself do not
reflect the new or purchase value. ltem 43, a bucket truck, is assigned a much
depreciated value as compared to the Yukon vehicle assigned to Kircher.
Leaving aside liquid assets whose value is readily determinable and the three
items which they wish to assign to each other, Dunagan grossly inflated the value
of items he assigned to Kircher. Dunagan was able to agree with Kircher in
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 prior to trial only as to the value of a freezer and computer of
the many items of personal property he assigned to Kircher. This contrasts with
Kircher who used the purchase cost as the value twice for items assigned to
Dunagan and agreed with Dunagan on the valuation for more items assigned to
Dunagan than assigned to her despite Dunagan being awarded far less items.
ltem 15: Dunagan testified he had $4700 in his bank account at the time
of trial. However, the key date for valuation is the date of the interlocutory
divorce. In light of this date, Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 uses the balances of all other
accounts prior to March 25,2006. Dunagan offered no reason why item 16

Page 17 - MEMORANDUM OPINION AND DECISION

should be treated any differently. Thus, $6000 as agreed to on Plaintiff's Exhibit
1 and Defendant's Exhibit A shall be used as the value.
ltems 17,18, and 19: The parties agree as to the value, but differ as to
who should receive the items. Dunagan purchased the items, but does not feel
he has room to store the items. The lack of a place to store the items is not a
reason to force their sale upon Kircher who does not wanf fhem. The ifems will
be assigned to Dunagan.
Item 21 is assigned to Kircher as her separate property. Even Dunagan
testified the jewelry was a gift.
ttem 4 1 and 43: Dunagan's values are closer to fair market value than
Kircher who used the purchase cost of the items, so Dunagan's values will be
adopted as the fair market value.
ltems 42 and 46: Kircher testified that Dunagan had purchased guns and
telecommunications equipment during their marriage that are not reflected in
Dunagan's valuation of the items. Kircher's suspicions may be well-grounded.
Despite virtually no contributions for the house payments, Dunagan, upon
questioning, could not explain where his salary went. However, Kircher was
unable to identify one specific item that was purchased in addition to the items
and values listed. Therefore, Kircher failed to meet her burden to show any
different value than the value posited by Dunagan who has a great deal of
expertise in the area of the value of guns and telecommunication devices. The
values attributed by Dunagan for his guns and telecommunications equipment
will be adopted as the values for purposes of distribution of property and debt.
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Dunagan suggested at trial that Kircher has hidden $6000 of cash.
Kircher admitted to hiding assets in a prior divorce. Half of the discrepancy was
explained by Kircher's odd method of bookkeeping which jumped around in
dates. The alleged discrepancy could be explained by the use of a money order
or certified check. I do not find that Dunagan has shown by a preponderance of
the evidence that Kircher has hidden any assets,
Kircher's request for attorney fees as set forth in item 51Iin Defendant's
Exhibit A is denied as no evidence was adduced showing financial need and
thereby entitlement to attorney fees under ldaho Code § 32-704(3).
7. Reimbursement to the Community.
Item 50: Kircher seeks reimbursement to the community of $20,000 for
payment in November 2003 on a 32 foot travel trailer owned by Dunagan
(W)hen community efforts, labor, industry, or funds enhance the
value of separate property, such enhancement is community
property for which the community is entitled to reimbursement. The
measure of reimbursement for community expenditures on
separate property is the increase in value of the property
attributable thereto, not the amount or value of the community
contribution.
Martsch v. Martsch, 103 ldaho 142, 147,645 P.2d 882, 887 (1982).
There was no testimony or evidence regarding the value of the travel
trailer at the time of the payoff in November 2003. The value of the trailer was
$25,000 on June 28, 2000. Plaintiffs Exhibit 15 at 1000578. The amount owing
on the trailer on June 28, 2000 was $20,000. Id. It is too remote in time to
extrapolate from November 2003 to June 28, 2000 to derive a value that was
enhanced by the payment made on the RV.
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Dunagan requests reimbursement to the community of the proceeds of a
loan that were used to pay off unsecured debts owed to Kircher's first husband.
However, no reimbursement is permitted for payments on antenuptial unsecured
debts. Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 172-173, 898 P.2d 1081,1083 -1084 (1995).
8. Equalization Payment
Dunagan is entitled to an equalization payment of $108,500. Kircher will
be granted sixty (60) days from the date of this decision in which to make this
payment. If Kircher makes such payment in full within said sixty (60) days,
Dunagan will sign over and release to Kircher all interest in the Crystal Cafe. If
Kircher does not make the equalization payment within the prescribed time, the
Crystal Cafe will be put up for sale in a commercially reasonable manner. There
is no other property available to pay Dunagan his equalization payment.
Dunagan and Kircher will list the Crystal property with an agreed upon
realtor. If the parties cannot agree, this Court, upon filing of a Motion, will select
a realtor. Kircher may continue to use the property until sold for her business.
Kircher shall keep the business in presentable condition in order to ensure its
value for purposes of selling. Kircher is responsible for paying expenses
associated with the property such as water, sewer, garbage, power, loan
payments, etc. Furthermore, Kircher is to cooperate with the real estate
personnel in all aspects in the sale of the property. Neither party will withhold
consent to any reasonable offer for the Cafe.
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CONCLUSION
The parties' assets and debts will be distributed as set forth in Exhibit A,
annexed hereto, consistent with this Memorandum. The Crystal Cafe will be sold
in a commercially reasonable manner as discussed above if the equalization
payment is not made within sixty (60) days of this Order. The parties will sign all
necessary papers effectuating the transfer of their interest in the property that is
assigned to the other party.

&y

DATED this @ d a y of July, 2006&&

Randall W. Robinson
Magistrate
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Paul Thomas Clark
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Lewiston. ID 83501
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~0000052

description
1) Krystal Cafe bldg
2) Krystal Cafe bus.
3) Krystal Cafe bank acct
4) Grand Ave house
5) wife's retirement acct
6) husb. retirement acct
7) w. smathers loan
8) 2005 tax ret.-wife
9)Zion's bank acct
orofino C.U. acct
11) Lewis-Clark C.U. acct
121Am-West KellvtSherrill
13j Bank of ~ataG-wife
14) Steve Lyman prints
15) B of A bank acct-husb.
16) 2005 GMC Denali
17) oak bedroom set
18) couch
19) TV & stand
20) fridge
21) ~eliy'sdiamonds
22) bedding-before marriage
23) utensils-before marriage
24) oak table & chairs
25) comforters
26) computers
27) her office desk
28) recliner
29) freezer
30) stove-wife's before marr.
31) washtdry-wife's before
32) stereo-wife's before
33) outdoor furntBBQ-wifes
34) coffeelend tables
35) microwave
36) 2003 Bayliner boat
37) DVDtsurround sound
38) lawn mower
39) camcorder
40) 2005 Dodge P.U.
41) flatbed trailer
42) guns
43) bucket truck
44) gun safe
45) recliner
46) telecomm. equip
47) tools
48) fishinglcamping gear
49) drift boat-husb. before
50) lawn mowertweedeater
51) 32' travel trailer

~b)

value
236,500
8174.91
14,306.17
125,000
10.254.52
18,386.23
22,244
2,309.00
2,926.99

debt
39594.64

equity
196,905.36

to wife

to husband

196,905.36
8174.91

58,921.36

14,306.17
66,078.64
10.254.52

28.877.39

122.61

745.77
2,585.41
$6.000
29,000
7500
1000
900
300

6000
122.61

7500
1000
900
300

54) taxes dispute
totals

S
-3000
-4500
536373

Equalization Payment

108,500

52) lamp

53)husband's VISA

151334.33

208,087.03

295,713.92

-3000
-4500
78480.23
108,500
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Case: CV-2005-0000324
Chris M Dunagan vs. Kelly A Dunagan
Selected Items

Hearing type:
Assigned judge:
Court reporter:
Minutes clerk:

Parties:
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Motion to Reconsider
Randall W. Robinson

Minutes date:
Start time:

08/07/2006
11:04AM

VICKY

End time:
11:21 AM
Audio tape number: CD181

Dunagan, Chris; Clark, Paul
Dunagan. Kelly; Jones, Garry
Honorable Randall Robinson presiding. Attorney Tom Clark present, via telephone,
Tape Counter: 1104
representing the Plaintiff. Attorney Garry Jones present, via telephone, representing the
Defendant.
Court notes Mr. Jones is correct. Decree should be nunc pro tunc back to date of
Tape Counter: 1104
Interlocutory Divorce. Also notes Mr. Jones is requesting the legal description of the real
property in items 1 & 4 to be included. Mr. Clark has no objection. Court will grant.
Mr. Jones advises just wishes to clarify some points.
Tape Counter: 1105
Court on item #3 believes it should be Ms. Dunegan's responsibilty for the expenses of the
Tape Counter: 1105
Krystal Cafe building in event she closes the business prior to sale of the building. It is her
building and has all rights of ownership.
Mr. Jones argues.
Tape Counter: 1106
Court advises it will be her choice whether to close the business before sale.
Tape Counter: 1107
Mr. Clark agrees with CouKs position.
Tape Counter: 1108
Mr. Jones inquires re expenses of sale and equalization payment.
Tape Counter: 1108
Court
clarifies expenses associated with the sale should be split between the parties and
Tape Counter: 1108
come out of the shares that have been attributed to the people.
Mr. Jones inquires re the equalization payment and taking the shares out, should be
Tape Counter: 1109
adjusted to reflect actual proceeds into the formula. Discussion with Court.
Court reluctant to allow a latter adjustment based upon a possibly latter change in market
Tape Counter: 1113
conditions.
Mr. Clark agrees with Court.
Tape Counter: 1115
Mr. Jones argues &further discussion with Court.
Jape Counter: 1115
Mr. Clark will stand on the record.
Tape Counter: 1120
Court will review the matter further and will issue a new Decree of Divorce.
Tape Counter: 1121
Court in recess.
Tape Counter: 1121
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ORDER TO AMEND DECREE OF
DIVORCE

A
The Defendant requests clarification of this Court's Decree of Divorce
entered on July 17, 2006, in five respects.
First, the Defendant requests that the Decree of Divorce be clarified that the
Decree of Divorce be established as March 21, 2006, the effective date of
interlocutory Decree of Divorce. This request will be granted. The Decree of

Divorce will be amended to reflect the date of March 21,2006 as the date of
divorce.
Second, the Defendant requests that the legal descriptions of the real
property be included in the Decree ofDivorce. This request will be granted.
Third, the Defendant requests clarification of the responsibilities of the
Defendant as to the payment of expenses associated with the Krystal Cafe building
in the event she closes her business prior to the sale of the building. In essence,
the Defendant requests a contribution from the Plaintiff to maintain the building
should she cease her business. The Defendant's request for such relief is denied.
The Defendant is awarded the business and the building. The building is
only sold should the Defendant fail to make the equalization payment. It is up to

ORDER TO AMEND DECREE
OF DIVORCE 1

i.::.,
"
:

the Defendant as to whether she wishes to operate her business or use the building
for other purposes such as rental. It is inequitable for the Defendant to keep all the
benefits to herself from the building without any payment to the Plaintiff while she
operates the business, but burden the Plaintiiwith the costs should the Defendant
choose to cease operating her business. The Amended Decree is modified to
clarify this point.
Fourth, the Defendant requests that this Court clarify the responsibility for
sale expenses, including, but not limited to any real estate commissions. The
Defendant's request is granted. The reasonable expenses directly incurred by the
sale of the building, such as the sales commission, will be equally borne by the
parties. One-half of the reasonable expenses directly associated with the sale of
the building will be deducted from the equalization payment Plaintiff is due of
$108,500.
Fifth, the Defendant requests clarification of the division of the net proceeds
should they not equal the equity contemplated by the Court. At the argument, the
Defendant requested that the amount of equalization vary according to the actual
amount that the property sells for. The Defendant's proposal has appeal as it gives
both the Defendant and the Plaintiff an equal stake in the sale. Despite such
appeal, I deny the Defendant's request.
The value of the equalization payment is fixed at the time of the Decree
based upon the fair market value of the property at the time of the divorce.
Brinkmeyerv. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596,600,21 P.3d 918 (2001). As noted by
the Supreme Court, "Any community asset may change in value after the division

ORDER TO AMEND DECREE
OFDIVORCE 2

of the community. This is not a reason to modify the division." Ross v. Ross, 117
Idaho 548, 554, 789 P.2d 1139 (1990). The Plaintiff should not be penalized by
the Defendant's actions while controlling use of the building or by the vagaries of
the market. By fixing the equalization payment, this Court is removed from
becoming intimately involved with the Plaintiffs actions or inactions in controlling
the building since the date the value was established. Also, the Defendant has
alternatives to selling the Cafe such as by selling her own home andlor by loans.
The Defendant argues she believes the business to be only worth
$150,000.00 and so the Plaintiff will receive a windfall in obtaining a
disproportionate value from the sale of the building. The Defendant at the trial
failed to offer any evidence to support her subjective belief as to the value of the
building other than anecdotal stories about two local properties that had not sold
quickly. The appraiser's value was adopted, a value which the appraiser said he
would pay for the property.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant's request for clarification that an Amended Decree of Divorce
be issued is granted with respect to the dating of the divorce back to March 25,
2006, the legal description of the property be set forth in the decree, and that. the
reasonable expenses associated with the sale be explicitly split between the
parties. The Defendant's request to clarify the divorce is denied in other respects.
DATED this

day of August, 2006.

d d@g~-;

(/ Y ~ b % ~
RANDALL W. ROBINSON
Magistrate
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed,
postage prepaid, on the 3.1",\ day of August, 2006 to:
Paul Thomas Clark
Attorney at Law
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Garry W. Jones
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN
Clerk of the District Court
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Deputy
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF $#4!,c"j5
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,
Plaintiff,
VS.

)
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1

CASE NO. CV 2005-00324
AMENDED DECREE OF

)

KELLY A. DUNAGAN,
Defendant.

)
)

This matter came before the court on June 20, 2006. A trial was conducted with
the parties present and Paul Thomas Clark representing the Plaintiff and Garry Jones
representing the Defendant. Based upon the Memorandum Opinion and Decision and
the Order to Amend Decree of Divorce entered in this case, Judgment is entered as
follows:
The Plaintii is and was a bona fide resident of the State of Idaho and has been a
resident for more than six (6) weeks preceding the filing of his complaint.
This Court has jurisdiction to determine the divorce and the property and debt
distribution.
An interlocutory divorce was entered between the parties effective on March 21,
2006 with property and debt issues resewed for the trial that took place on June 20,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED:
1. The bonds of matrimony between the Plaintiff and the Defendant are

dissolved on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, and the Defendant awarded an
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absolute decree of divorce from the Plaintiff nunc pro tunc to March 21,2006, the
effective date of the Interlocutory Decree of Divorce.
2. The property and debts of the parties shall be divided as set forth in Exhibit A,
annexed hereto, with the addition that the Plaintiff shall receive a copier from the
Defendant. More specifically, with respect to the real property, the Defendant shall be
awarded the real property at 12350 Grand Avenue, Orofino, ldaho with the legal
description of ""Lots 6, 7, and 8, Block 2, Day's Addition, according to the recorded plat
thereof, records of Cleatwater County, Idaho." The parties will sign all necessary
papers effectuating the transfer of their interest in the property that is assigned to the
other party except for the Krystal Cafe property, as discussed below.

3. The Defendant shall also be awarded the real property upon which the Krystal
Cafe is located at 130 Johnson Avenue, Orofino, Idaho with the legal description of
"Lots 7 and 8, block 2, Day's Addition, according to the recorded plat thereof, records of
Cleatwater County, Idaho" upon payment to the Plaintiff of an equalization payment of
$108,500. The Defendant shall have sixty (60) days to make the equalization payment
to the Plaintiff of $108,500. Upon payment in full of the equalization payment of
$108,500 within said sixty (60) days, the Plaintiff will sign over and release to the
Defendant all interest in the Krystal Cafe. If the Defendant does not make the
equalization payment within the prescribed time, the Krystal Cafe will be put up for sale
in a commercially reasonable manner. The Plaintiff and the Defendant will list the
Krystal Cafe property with an agreed upon realtor. If the parties cannot agree, upon
filing of a Motion, this Court will select a realtor. The Defendant shall cooperate with the
real estate personnel in all aspects in the sale of the property. Neither party will
withhold consent to any reasonable offer. The Defendant may continue to use the
Page 2 -AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE
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property until sold for her business or for any other purpose consistent with reasonable
use of the building including rental. The Defendant shall keep the building in
presentable condition in order to ensure its value for purposes of selling. The
Defendant is responsible for paying expenses associated with the property such as
water, sewer, garbage, power, and loan payments. Furthermore, the parties shall share
equally the reasonable expenses directly associated with the sale. The equalization
payment will be reduced by the Plaintiff's one-half share of the reasonable costs directly
associated with the sale that are not paid by him prior to the sale.
DATED this

2ddayof

$

5

,2006

Randall W. Robinson,
Magistrate Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage
prepaid, on the

day of

ki~!&a*
2006, to the following:
;
i

Paul Thomas Clark
Clark and Feeney
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Garry W. Jones
Jones, Brower & Callery
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
OBIN CHRISTENSEN, Clerk
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Gamy W. Jones
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys at Law
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-3591
Idaho State Bar No. 1254

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,
Plaintiff,
VS.
KELLY A. DUNAGAN,
Defendant.

)
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1
1
1
1

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Fee Category: R(l)(c)
Fee Amount: $53.00

COMES NOW, KELLY A. DUNAGAN, defendant, by and through her attorney of record,
GARRY W. JONES of the law oMices of JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C., and pursuant
to Rule 83, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby appeals from the Amended Decree of Divorce
dated August 25,2006, entered by the Honorable Randall W. Robinson.

I.

The title of the court from which the appeal is taken is the Magistrate Division of the

District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Clearwater.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

2.

The title of the court to which the appeal is taken is the District Court of the Second

Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Cleanvater.

3.

The date and heading of the judgment(s) ftom which the appeal is taken is the entry

of the Amended Decree of Divorce dated August 25,2006.
4.

The appeal is taken upon both matters of law and fact.

5.

The testimony and proceedings of the hearing was heard on June 20, 2006. All

proceedings were recorded by audio tape by the Cleanvater County Clerk's office. The Clerk of the
court, District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Cleanvater, is in possession of the reported record of these proceedings.
6.

Issues on appeal:
a.

Whether the Court erred in determining that the defendant
transmuted her home Eom her separate property to community
property.

b.

Whether the Court erred in failing to award an unequal distribution
of property in favor of the defendant.

c.

Whether the Court erred in requiring the defendant to continue to
be responsible for the condition of property ordered by the Court
to be sold and further requiring the defendant to be responsible for
paying all expenses associated with the property such as water,
sewer, garbage, power and loan payments.

d.

Whether the Court erred in failing to reallocate sale proceeds fTom
the sale of the Krystal Kafe building in the event the sale price of
said building is less than the $196,906.36 equity contemplated by
the Court.

e.

Whether the Court erred in failing to find the existence of an
agreement between the parties that they would keep all of their
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respective property acquired prior to mamage, as their sole and
separate property during their marriage.

7.

It is hereby requested pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83G) that the appeal

be heard as an appellant proceeding and that transcripts be prepared as provided by Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 83(k).

1day of October, 2006.
A

DATED this

x

JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

Attorney for &&ant,
Defendant

NOTICE OF APPEAL

KELLY A. DUNAGAN,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I KEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
APPEAL was this& day of October, 2006,

-

hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
- hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
- transmitted via facsimile
- transmitted via e-mail

+

to:
PAUL THOMAS CLARK
CLARK & FEENEY
THE TRAIN STATION, SUITE 201
13TH& MAIN STREETS
P.O. DRAWER 285
LEWISTON, ID 83501

Attorney for bkendant

NOTICE OF APPEAL

PAUL THOMAS CLARK
Idaho State Bar No. 1329
CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
The Train Station, Suite 201
13th and Main Streets
P. 0. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
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VS.
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Defendant.
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NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL

)

KELLY DUNAGAN,

TO:

Case No. CV 05-00324

1

Plaintiff,

18

DEPUT''

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF WANO,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

8
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1
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KELLY DUN;~GANAND HER ATTORNEY OF RECORD GARRY JONES, AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
Pursuant to Rule 83(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as Rule I1 of the Idaho

( Appellate Rules, notice is hereby given that:

25

1.

This appeal is taken from the magistrate's division of the above-entitled court.

2.

This appeal is taken to the district court of the above-entitled court.

3.

This appeal is taken from the Memorandum Opinion and Decision entered July 17,

2006; The Honorable Randall Robinson presiding.

26
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CLARK A N D FEENEY
LEWISTON. lOAHO 83501

I

1

4.

This appeal is taken upon matter of law and fact.

2

5.

The testimony and/or proceedings of the original trial were recorded and are in the

possession of the Clearwater County Clerk.

4

6.

The issue of appeal is: Did the magistrate err in the manner in which he valued the

5
6
7

community property of item 41 on Exhibit A?

-t"

DATED This @ day of October, 2006.
CLARK AND FEENEY

8
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BY

10
11

12
l3
14
15

l6
17
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I hereby certify on the day of October, 2006, a true copy
of the foregoing instrument
was:
Mailed
- Faxed
- Hand delivered to:
Mr. Gany W. Jones
Jones, Brower & Callery
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, I
D 83501
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

- COURT MINUTES John R. Stegner
District Judge

Jodi M. Stordiau
Court Reporter
Recording: J: 3/2007-06-06
Time: 1:28 P.M.

Date: June 6,2007

Plaintiff/Respondent,

1
1
1

VS.

)

CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,

IGLLY A. DUNAGAN KERCHER,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. CV-05-00324

1

APPEARANCES:

1
1

Plaintiff/Respondent represented by
Paul Thomas Clark, Lewiston, ID

)
)

1

Defendant/Appellant represented by
Garry W. Jones, Lewiston, ID

)
Defendant.

1

)
Subject of Proceedings: APPELLATE ARGUMENT
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for hearing appellate
argument in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel.

Mr. Jones argued on behalf of the appellant. Mr. Clark argued on behalf of the
respondent. Mr. Jones argued in rebuttal.
Court took the matter under advisement, informing counsel it would render a
written decision.
Court recessed at 2:17 P.M.
APPROVED BY:

$17

J HN R. STEGNER
DISTRICT JUDGE
Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
COT JRT MINUTES
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

1
1
1

)

Case No. CV 05-00324

1
VS.

)

KELLY A. DUNAGAN KIRCHER,

1
1

OPINION ON APPEAL

This case is on appeal from the Magistrate Division of Clearwater County, the
Honorable Randall W. Robinson presiding. Oral argument was heard June 6,2007
Carry W. Jones, of the law firm Jones, Brower and Callery, argued on behalf of the
Appellant, Kelly A. Dunagan Kircher (Kircher). Paul Thomas Clark, of the law firm
Clark and Feeney, argued on behalf of the Respondent, Chris M. Dunagan (Dunagan)

I. BACKGROUND
Shortly after their marriage on May 27,2000, Kircher and Dunagan purchased
the Krystal Caf6, a business Kircher had been operating prior to the marriage. The
couple also purchased the real property on which the business was located. They then
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sold a portion of the unrelated real property a short time later. After purchasing the
cafe, the building underwent extensive renovations, finally reopening in October 2001.
On November 24,2003, residential property which had been owned by Kircher
prior to the marriage was refinanced through Zions Bank. As a condition of the
refinancing, Kircher quitclaimed her interest in her home to "Kelly Dunagan and Chris
Dunagan, wife and husband." Zions Bank subsequently recorded the deed with the
Clearwater County Recorder. At trial, Kircher testified that she signed lots of papers at
the closing and did not know that she was giving up any interest in her home to
Dunagan. She also testified that she would not have signed the conveyance had she
understood she was transferring an interest in her property to Dunagan. Dunagan
objected to Kircher's testimony on the grounds that it violated the parol evidence rule.
The Magistrate Judge initially overruled Dunagan's objection, allowing Kircher's
testimony. However, in his Memorandum Opinion and Decision, Judge Robinson
ultimately rejected Kircher's testimony because it violated the parol evidence rule.
(Memorandum Opinion and Decision, 16).
According to Kircher, at the time the couple married, they orally agreed to keep
their finances separate. During their marriage, Dunagan and Kircher in fact kept their
finances separate. Kircher paid all insurance and other payments on the house and on
the Krystal Cafe. Dunagan gave Kircher $500 on two occasions. At triaI, Dunagan
objected to Kircher's testimony regarding this separation of finances on the grounds
that it violated the statute of frauds. The trial court and the parties subsequently
engaged in a colloquy regarding the issue. Ultimately, Dunagan's objection was
Opinion on Appeal

sustained; however, counsel for Kircher was allowed to elicit the testimony for
purposes of attempting to establish a compelling reason for an unequal distribution of
community property. In his Memorandum Opinion and Decision, Judge Robinson held
that evidence of the oral antenuptial agreement was not admissible under Idaho law,
and that even if it were admissible, it failed to establish a compelling circumstance for
warranting an unequal distribution of community property.

,

Dunagan and Kircher separated in 2005 and obtained a divorce on March 23,
2006. On June 20,2006, a trial was conducted to determine the distribution of property
and debt. The trial resulted in Judge Robinson determining an equal disposition of the
community property was appropriate. Following an accounting and division of the
marital assets, the trial judge ordered Kircher to pay Dunagan an equalization sum of
$108,500. Additionally, the court held the transfer of Dunagan's interest in the Krystal
Cafe to Kircher was predicated upon the equalization payment. The judge gave Kircher
sixty days to make the payment or the building would be sold and the proceeds divided
equally, as there was no other property that could be sold to achieve a substantially
equal distribution of the community property.
Kircher appealed Judge Robinson's decision, raising the following issues:
1) Whether the court made a mistake of law in ruling that evidence of an oral

antenuptial agreement did not constitute a compelling circumstance for
ordering an unequal disposition of the community property;
2) Whether the court abused its discretion by ruling that the circumstances
surrounding the marital home were not a compelling reason to order an
unequal disposition of the community property;
3) Whether the court abused its discretion in the disposition of the Krystal Caf6;
and,
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4) Whether the court achieved "substantial equality" in the disposition of the
community property.
On cross-appeal, Dunagan raised one issue concerning the value of a flatbed trailer.
11. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When acting in the capacity of an appellate court, the district court reviews
appeals from the magistrate court according to the same scope and standard of review
as the Supreme Court reviews appeals from the district court. I.R.C.P. 83(U)(1).The
standard of review varies depending upon whether the issue presented is one of law, of
fact, or of discretion. The Magistrate Judge's legal conclusions are subject to free
review. Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373,146 P.2d 639,644. The Magistrate Judge's
findings of fact are reviewed to determine if they are supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Henteges v. Henteges, 125 Idaho 192,194,765 P.2d 1094,1096 (Ct.
App. 1988). Finally, questions of discretion are reviewed to determine if the trial court's
decision was within his discretion, consistent with applicable legal standards, and
reached through the exercise of reason. Id. This Court will uphold the Magistrate
Judge's decision as long as it is supported by substantial and competent evidence and
the Magistrate Judge correctly applied sound legal principles to those facts. Id.

111. DISCUSSION
A. Oral Antenuptial Agreement

The first issue raised by Kircher involves an antenuptial agreement. I.C. 5 32-

712(1)@)(2). Klrcher argues that Judge Robinson erred as a matter of law by failing to
consider the purported oral antenuptial agreement between herself and Dunagan, to
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keep their finances separate. Kircher, on one hand, concedes that statutory law in Idaho
requires a contract for a "marriage settlement" to be in writing. See 1.C. 5 32-917. While
conceding that point, Kixcher argues for a change in the law. Kircher asks this Court to
create an exception for oral marital contracts, which are supported by part performance,
similar to ihe exception widely recognized for real property. See jolley v. Clay, 103 Idaho
171,177,646 P.2d 413,419 (1982). Kircher cites California, Washington, and Colorado
case law to the effect that each state has created a part performance exception to the
statute of frauds in this context.
Idaho courts, however, have remained firm in holding that to be enforceable,
premarital agreements must be in writing. See Stevens v. Stevens, 135 Idaho 224,16 P.3d
900 (2000). In light of the great weight of Idaho authority, this Court holds that a
marriage settlement must be in writing and consequently, no part performance
exception exists. Thus, the Magistrate Judge's refusal to consider evidence concerning
the oral antenuptial agreement was a correct application of Idaho law and Judge
Robinson's holding should be affirmed in this regard.

B. Marital Home
The second issue raised by Kircher is whether the Judge's refusal to consider
evidence surrounding the marital home constituted an abuse of discretion. It must be
remembered that at the time Kircher refinanced the marital home she quitclaimed the
property to herself and Dunagan. At trial, in an attempt to render the transmutation of
the marital home ineffective, Kircher testified that she did not realize she was

transferring a n interest in her house to Dunagan when she quitclaimed an interest to
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him. She also testified that had she known, she would not have signed the deed. The
Magistrate Judge rejected Kircher's testimony because it was in violation of the parol
evidence rule. As a result, Judge Robinson considered the house to be community
property and divided its value equally.
On appeal, Kircher does not argue the admissibility of her testimony as it applies
to the effectivenessof the deed. Instead, she argues that the Magistrate Judge could
have considered the evidence as proof of the hardship she will endure as a result of an
equal disposition of the community property. She argues that the list of factors in I.C. §
32-712(1)(b)is not exhaustive and that it was within the Judge Robinson's discretion to
consider more evidence to determine whether a hardship would result from an equal
disposition of the community property,
Although the statute states that the list of factors is non-exhaustive, the majority
of cases where the trial court has allowed an unequal division have discussed hardship
in the context of LC. 5 32-712. See e.g. Hentges, 115 Idaho at 195,765 P.2d at 1097. An

unequal division was affirmed in Hentges because the husband was paralyzed,
unemployable, and in need of extensive medical care. The Idaho Court of Appeals
recognized the important factors in the case were, inter alia, the health and
employability of each spouse, the amount and source of each party's income, the needs
of each spouse, and his or her potential earning capabilities. The decision to allow a n
unequal disposition was upheld because, "[the Magistrate's] decision was consistent
with the factors set forth in I.C. 32-712.. ." Id. at 196,765 P.2d at 1098. Furthermore, the
purpose of I.C. 3 32-712 is, in part, to set guidelines and boundaries for the Magistrate
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Judge to follow in making the "threshold decision" between equal and unequal division
of community property. See Donndelinger, 107Idaho at 435,690 P.2d at 370.
This Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge did not abuse his discretion in
rejecting Kircher's testimony. Kircher attempted to present the evidence at trial in an
effort to invalidate the quitclaim deed. The purpose of the parol evidence rule is to
preserve the integrity of written documents. Miller Const. Co. v. Stresstek, a Div.of L.R.
Yegge, Co., 108 Idaho 187,190,697 P.2d 1201,1204 (Ct. App. 1985). The testimony was
excluded because it was sought to set aside a valid deed. Kircher has failed to explain
how evidence, which is rejected because of the parol evidence rule, would become
admissible when offered for a different purpose. Although Kircher argues that the
testimony was evidence of a hardship, unlike the husband in Hentges, she fails to
explain her hardship in the context of I.C. § 32-712. The Magistrate Judge's decision to
exclude evidence regarding the transmutation of the marital home was within his
discretion, consistent with applicable legal standards, and reached through the exercise
of reason. Consequently, that decision will not be set aside.
C. Disposition of Krystal Caf6

Kircher next argues Judge Robimson abused his discretion regarding the Krystal
Caf6 in two ways. First, she contends, Judge Robimson failed to follow any of the
guidelines set forth by LC. 5 32-713, which govern the disposition of real property.
Second, she maintains the judge should have based the equalization sum on the actual
sale price, rather than on the fair market value established at trial.
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The guidelines set forth by I.C. 5 32-713 afford the trial court the option of: (1)
awarding the property to one party with a corresponding award of value of property to
the other; (2) ordering the property sold and dividing the proceeds equally between the
parties; or (3) ordering the pr'operty partitioned between the parties. Larson v. Larson,
139 Idaho 970,972,88 P.3d 1210,1212. In addition, "in appropriate circumstances, the
trial court can also award property to one spouse and order the other to make payments
over a reasonable period of time to equalize the division." Id.
Judge Robinson's order awards the Krystal Caf6 to Kircher if she makes an
equalization payment of $108,500 within six months. If payment is not made within six
months, the building is to be sold and the proceeds divided equally. On appeal Kircher
argues that the judge's disposition constitutes an abuse of discretion because it does not
award Kircher the building outright, which she argues is required under the first option
of LC. 5 32-713. Further, Kircher contends the second option was not followed because
if the building is sold, the proceeds cannot be divided equally given that the debt

associated with the building was also assigned to Kircher. Thus, she contends, the trial
judge abused his discretion because he exercised none of the options available to him
under Idaho Code § 32-713.
Kircher's argument, however, ignores the fourth option available under Larson,
that the trial court can award property to one spouse and order payments made over a
reasonable period of time to equalize the division. See also Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431,
860 P.2d 634 (1993). At its root, Kircher's real objection is to the value established for
the property by the judge. However, Dunagan's real estate expert was essentially
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uncontradicted in his valuation, unless one considers the testimony of Kircher, who is
neither an expert nor unbiased. While this Court might have decided this case
differently, that is clearly not the standard of review to be applied.
The second reason Kircher attacks Judge Robinson's decision regarding the
disposition of the Krystal Cafe is because she believes the judge failed to exercise
discretion in basing the equalization sum on the fair market value rather than the sale
price. Kircher points to the following language from the judge's opinion as the basis for
her argument:
The Defendant's proposal has appeal as it gives both the Defendant and the
Plaintiff an equal stake in the sale. Despite such appeal, I deny Defendant's
request.
The value of the equalization payment is fixed at the time of the Decree
based upon the fair market value of the property at the time of the divorce.
Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596,600,21 P.3d 918 (2001). As noted by the
Supreme Court, "Any community asset may change in value after the division of
the community. This is not a reason to modify the division." Ross v. Ross, 117
Idaho 548,554,789 P.2d 1139 (1990). The Plaintiff should not be penalized by the
Defendant's actioits while controlling use of the building or by the vagaries of
the market. By fixing the equalization payment, this Court is removed from
becoming intimately involved with the Plaintiff's actions or inactions in
controlling the building since the date the value was established. Also, the
Defendant has alternatives to selling the Cafe such as by selling her own home
and/or by loans.
Order to Amend Decree ofDivorce, pg. 2-3. Kircher argues this language somehow
suggests Judge Robinson felt bound to base the equalization payment on the market
value of the caf6 rather than its selling price. The first problem with this argument is
that it assumes Kircher will sell the building. The judge clearly wanted the person
controlling the asset to bear the risk of market changes. It was reasonable to assume
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Kircher would keep the building so she could continue running her business. Such a
decision could have delayed the equalization payment indefinitely. While it may be
possible for a judge to retain jurisdiction, doing so is contrary to established policy
favoring finality in judgments. The amended decree suggests the judge consciously
exercised his discretion in favor of finality and chose to determine the value of the caf6
at the time of trial, rather than becoming, as he put it "intimately involved with the
Plaintiff's actions." Id. Thus, the judge's decision was within his discretion, consistent
with applicable legal standards, and reached through the exercise of reason. AS a
result, it should not be set aside.
D. Substantial Equality

The next issue brought by Kircher's appeal is whether the judge arrived at a
substantially equal division of the community property. This is a factual question. As
noted, factual questions will not be disturbed if they are based on substantial evidence.
In a case such as this, the judge must divide the community property equally
unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise. Larson, 139 Idaho at 972,88 P.3d at
1212. Although a judge may choose an equal division, the law does not require a
mathematically equal division, nor is such a division likely to be achieved. Shepard V.

Shepard, 94 Idaho 734,735,497 P.2d 321,322 (1972). The goal, rather, is to achieve a
division that is substantially equal in value. Ross v.Ross, 117 Idaho 548,554,789 P.2d
1139,1145 (1990).
Kircher argues that because the trial judge ordered the equalization sum to be
based upon the fair market value of the Krystal Cafi!, as opposed to the eventual sale
Opinion on Appeal

80~00079

price, it cannot be determined whether the division was truly equal. She argues the
division will only be equal if the Krystal Cafe sells for $236,500, the fair market value of
the caM determined at trial. She concludes that the building will likely sell for much
less, rendering the division unequal. Her argument is unavailing. As noted, the only
expert testimony elicited at trial set the value of the cafi at $236,500. To the extent
Kircher disputes the trial judge's conclusions, she is in reality in disagreement with the
proof presented at trial. This is not a valid basis for this Court to disturb the trial
judge's decision. Furthermore, in the interest of finality and certainty, the Magistrate
Judge is not requirbd to achieve an exactly equal division, rather he is only required to
substantially approximate an equal division, A review of the record reveals that the
Magistrate Judge did just that. He heard testimony from each side, he weighed that
testimony and he made a decision, based on substantial evidence, that approximates ail
equal division of the community property.
E. Value of Flatbed Trailer

Finally, it is clear from the record, and the parties agree, that Judge Robinson
erred in calculating the value of a flatbed trailer. The trailer was valued by the parties
at $600. However, the decree of divorce listed the value as $6,000. This appears to be a
simple typographical error. On this issue and this issue alone, the decision of the trial
judge is reversed and remanded to correct this error.
CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge's decision is AFFIRMED in its entirety with the exception
of the value of Dunagan's flatbed trailer. The case is REMANDGD to Judge Robinson
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for a recalculation of the distribution of the community proper9 of the parties based on
the changed value of the flatbed trailer.
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C

l(ohn R. Stegner
District judge
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KELLY A. DUNAGAN,

)

Appellant.
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TO:
TO:
TO:

CHRIS M. DUNAGAN, the above named respondent; and
PAUL THOMAS CLARK, attorney for the above-named respondent; and
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellant, KELLY A. DUNAGAN, appeals against the above

named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Opinion on Appeal entered in the aboveentitled action on the 26' day of July, 2007, Honorable Judge John R Stegner presiding.
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2.

That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
Rule 1l(a)(2) I.A.R.

3.

The issues on appeal are:
a.

Whether the Court erred in determining that the appellant
transmuted her home from her separate property to community
propew.

b.

Whether the Court erred in failing to award an unequal distribution
of property in favor of the appellant.

c.

Whether the Court erred in requiring the appellant to continue to
be responsible for the condition of property ordered by the Court
lo be sold and further requiring the appellant to be responsible for
paying all expenses associated with the property such as water,
sewer, garbage, power and loan payments.

d.

Whether the Court erred in failing to reallocate sale proceeds from
the sale of the Krystal Kafe building in the event the sale price of
said building is less than the $196,906.36 equity contemplated by
the Cow.

e.

Whether the Court erred in failing to find the existence of an
agreement between the parties that they would keep all of their
respective property acquired prior to marriage, as their sole and
separate property during their marriage.

f.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Such others issues which may he raised by appellant.
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4.

No orders have been entered sealing any portion of the record.

5.

The appellants request the preparation of the entire reporter's standard transcript as

defined in Rule 25(a), I.A.R.

6.

The appellant requests the Clerk's record be prepared as automatically included

under Rule 28, I.A.R.:

7.

1certify:

(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter.

(b)

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee
for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has

(c)

been paid.
(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.

DATED this

24day of August, 2007.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

Attorney f u e l l a n t

NOTICE OF APPEAL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I IEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
APPEAL was, this &bay of August, 2007,

-

hand-delivered by providing a
copy to: Valley Messenger Service;
hand-delivered;
mailed, postage pre-paid,
by first class mail; or
transmitted via facsimile
TO(208) 746-9160

to:
PAUL THOMAS CLARK
CLARK AND FEENEY
THE TRAIN STATION, SUITE 20 1
13TH & MAEV STREETS
P.O. DRAWER 285
LEWISTON, ID 83501

Attorney f ~ p p e i l a n t
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Vs .
KELLY A. DUNAGAN,
Defendant-Appellant,

)

1
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2005-00324
DOCKET NO. #34516
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF EXHIBITS

I,ROBjN CHRISTENSEN, Clerk ofthe District County of the Second Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify:
That the following is a list of lodged document which are being forwarded to the
Supreme Court as Exhibits in this cause:
EXHIBITS: See Exhibit List filed 10/29/07
LODGED DOCUMENTS:
Transcript of a Court Trial on June lgthand 2oth,2006.

&?

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and official seal this
day of October, 2007.

-'JJ
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Date: 10/29/2007
Time: 10:
Page 1 of 2

Number
1

-

Second Judicial District Court Clearwater County

!M

User SUE

Exhibit Summary
Case: CV-2005-0000324
Chris M Dunagan vs. Kelly A Dunagan
Sorted by Exhibit Number

Description

Result

Storage Location
Property Item Number

1 - Property value and debt list,
distribution summary.

Admitted

Court file

2 - 2001 tax return

Assigned to:
Admitted

Clark, Paul Thomas
court file
Clark, Paul Thomas

3 - 2002 tax return.

Assigned to:
Admitted

Clark, Paul Thomas

6 - 2005 Tax return

Assigned to:
Admitted
Assigned to:
Admitted

Clark, Paul Thomas

Clark, Paul Thomas

10 - PurchaselSale agreement.

Assigned to:
Admitted

Clark, Paul Thomas.

11 - Loan documents.

Assigned to:
Admitted

Clark, Paul Thomas

12 - Restricted use report

Assigned to:
Admitted
Assigned to:
Admitted

Clark, Paul Thomas

Assigned to:
Admitted

Clark, Paul Thomas

Clark. Paul Thomas

15 - Residential loan application.

Assigned to:
Admitted

Clark, Paul Thomas

16 -Tax asset detail.

Assigned to:
Admitted

Clark, Paul Thomas

23 - Defendant's bank statement.

Assigned to:
Admitted
Assigned to:
Admitted

Clark, Paul Thomas

Assigned to:

Jones, Garry W

8 - Answer to Plaintiffs 1st set of
interogatories.

13 -Appraisal report by Carmen
Cody
14 - 2005 Tax return of
Christopher Dunagan.

A - Value and debt distribution
summary.

court file

court file

court file

court file

court file

court file

court file

court file

court file

court file

court file

court file

Destroy
Notification Destroy or
Date
Return bate

Date: 10/29/2007
Time 10
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Second Judicial District Court Clearwater County

.M

User SUE

Exhibit Summary
Case: CV-2005-0000324
Chris M Dunagan vs. Kelly A Dunagan
Sorted by Exhibit Number

Description

Result

Storage Location
Property Item Number

B - Chronological bank
statements

Admitted

court file

Assigned to:

Jones, Garry W

Destroy
Notification Destrov or
Date
Return bate

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)

1
)
)
)
)

v s.
KELLY A. DUNAGAN,
Defendant-Appellant,

CASE NO. CV2005-00324
DOCKET NO. #34516
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

j
1
)

I, Sue K. Summerton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial
District of the State of ldaho, in and for the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that
the above and foregoing record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound
under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleading and
documents under Rule 28 of the ldaho Appellate Rules.
I further certify that all documents lodged, including briefs, in the above entitled
cause will be duly lodged as Exhibits with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, along with
the Court Reporter's Transcript, if requested, and Clerk's Record.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I h ve hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
said Court at Orofino, Idaho this $h ay of October, 2007.
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HRISTENSEN
Clerk of the District Court

Deputy

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)

vs.

1

KELLY A. DUNAGAN,

)
)
)

Defendant-Appellant,

CASE NO. CV2005-00324
DOCKET NO. #34516
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1
)

)
I, Sue K. Summerton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that
I have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, a copy of
the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript, if a transcript was requested, to each of
the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows:

Paul T. Clark
Clark and Feeney
P.O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, ID 83501

Garry W. Jones
Jones, Brower & Callery
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
seal of the said Court this
day of October, 2007.
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

